Abstract: Given their growth records, large markets, and reformed economic systems, both China and India appear to be equally likely candidates for foreign direct investment (FDI). Yet, China has received substantially more FDI. The literature comparing FDI in these two countries is small, and does not provide conclusive evidence to explain this puzzle. Applying the Porterian framework of the competitiveness of nations to compare China and India, we garner evidence that differences in demand, factor conditions and firm strategy, structure and rivalry are not sufficient to explain the differential in the two countries' FDI flows. Differences in related and supporting industries, as well as Porter's other two factors-government and chance factors-are more compelling. We identify China's early entry into East Asian production networks in the 1980s as a key factor pushing China ahead of India in terms of FDI. We argue that this coincidental mix of timing and geography (Porter's 'chance' factor), pushed forward in China by establishing special economic zones, gave China a sustainable competitive advantage for the following two decades. What is implied from these findings is that China's FDI sources have been much larger and heavily slanted towards East Asia and manufacturing, while India, having missed this particular historical phase, needed to find an alternate route to development and global competitiveness.
Introduction
Impressive projections of growth in India and China are increasingly optimistic and have caught the attention of analysts and policy makers around the world. By purchasing power measures, in 2010 India was ranked as the fourth largest economy in the world in terms of the value of goods and services produced annually, and China was second. In the five years from 2005 to 2009, India's average GDP growth rate has been 8.5 percent and China's has been 11.4 percent (World Databank) . The importance of trade and foreign investment in China has grown substantially, which has been a hallmark of the success of China's opening policies that began almost three decades ago. India began to encourage trade and foreign investment a decade later than China, but has also successfully changed India's trade dynamics with the global economy. Based on the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Index for 2010-11, China ranked 27 th and India was 51 st . In the 2001-02 report, China was 39 th and India was 57 th , showing that competitiveness has improved substantially in both countries relative to many others (World Economic Forum, 2009 ).
In contrast, in decades past both India and China pursued import substitution industrialization policies aimed at isolation from the global economy. Both countries combined restrictive trade policies with various degrees of economic planning and regulation, all of which focused on building productive capacity at the expense of consumer preferences. Imports and production of non-essential consumer goods were highly restricted. The fact that these economies have rejoined the market-oriented, international system represents revolutionary shifts in policy, and consumers have been one of the major beneficiaries.
Given the growth paths and the size of these two economies, both countries would seem to be magnets for multinational corporations. However, China's foreign investment, and especially foreign direct investment (FDI), has been multiple times more than India's. Between 1995 and , China received approximately $730 billion more than India. There has been much debate about the measures used to assess the FDI potential of the two countries, but even when adjustments are made for differences in data categories, China's FDI is surprisingly higher than India's (Khanna 2007, pp.157-58; Swamy 2006) . In this paper we focus on what factors or strategies caused China to attract more FDI as compared to India. Using Porter's framework, we explore each country's circumstances that support or impede the pursuit of strategic competitiveness (Porter, 1998a) . We argue that Porter's factors of "chance" and "government" played crucial roles in attracting a higher level of FDI to China and also defined the type of FDI in one nation versus the other. We believe that the story of China's substantial lead in FDI lies in its fortuitous location intertwined with the timing of its reforms that resulted in its increasingly central role in the East Asian region.
China-India FDI Literature
The substantial difference in the level of FDI receipts in these two nations is a puzzle. There are numerous publications comparing economic growth and transition in China and India on various dimensions, but there are very few studies that focus on FDI per se. 1 Most studies focus on explanations for differences in growth and other performance variables, with FDI sometimes included as one factor.
One exception is a paper by Wei (2005) that tries to explain the FDI differential directly. Using OECD data across countries and over time on home country outward investment to China and India, Wei tested for possible factors that are significant in explaining FDI flows. Based on 1987 to 2000 FDI flows for 15 countries, Wei found that both countries benefit from their large domestic markets (measured as the ratio of real home country GDP to real host country's GDP), but that China's relatively larger market overwhelms some of India's other advantages. Interestingly, India benefits from relatively lower labor costs, as well as lower country risk, while China benefits from more advanced trade ties with the OECD countries. This approach of using outward FDI data from OECD provides adequate data for statistical analysis and also minimizes data discrepancy issues since the FDI definitions are the same and are reported by the home countries. However, as Wei's study only covers OECD countries, which do not make up the majority of FDI inflow to either India or China, the author acknowledges that the results are only a part of the story.
A second paper by Sinha, Kent and Shomali (2007) used data from three subregions in China for , and separately from six states in India for 1992-2005, to estimate in each case how the business climates affected FDI inflows. In the case of India, their model suggests a positive correlation between FDI inflow and human capital, market size and rate of growth. In their China estimates, structural changes, strategic infrastructure and strategic policy are positively correlated with FDI inflows, along with market size and rate of growth. As these data, variables and results are described only briefly in the paper, it is difficult to compare this work with Wei's study or to provide more details. Not surprisingly, the authors conclude that India needs structural change, better infrastructure and more enlightened policy to attract more FDI.
Using an alternative approach, Henley (2004) focuses on political differences.
Henley argues that some interest groups within India have impeded liberalization.
Specifically he suggests that they pressure various levels of government for spending resulting in public deficits that prevent government funding for infrastructure and other pro-development projects, thus discouraging FDI. In contrast, local governments in China responded to incentives to promote FDI, including direct mandates to show that they had attracted FDI, as well as opportunities to reap the tax revenues that would be generated by these companies. Henley argues that local governments in India have much less motivation to want FDI in their jurisdictions. While political differences no doubt matter in some aspects-especially the slowness of opening the economy to global business in the 1980s-this explanation seems inadequate to us. There are certainly states in India that have attracted FDI, just as in China certain provinces and cities have benefitted relatively more from foreign investment. In addition, some analysts argue that India's democracy is a distinct political advantage over China's one-party system, which would make politics a relative strength for India. Fan and Li (2009) note that while the Indian growth process is chaotic, India's soft infrastructure, which includes a independent press, an independent judicial system and educational system, is robust putting India at an advantage. Particular credit is given to the banking infrastructure that was not deeply affected by the recent financial meltdown of the developed nations.
Kumar and Worm's (2004) study provides a detailed examination of the various aspects of institutional environments in India and China in order to compare business negotiation processes. They note that while the regulatory environment can be a hurdle for investors in both nations, these barriers are more easily navigated in China than in India given the incentives for bureaucrats to promote economic growth in their regions.
This has been substantiated by Sebastian, Parameswaran and Yahya (2006) 
FDI Location Literature: increasing importance of spatial concentration and alliances
FDI location has been studied in the literature with a focus on factors that push or pull companies to invest abroad (Krugman 1991 , Porter 1994 , Majocchi and Strange 2007 ). An early FDI framework was provided by Dunning (1977 Dunning ( , 1980 )-the so-called eclectic approach to understanding the location decisions of foreign companies. In addition, other studies such as Rugman and Verbeke (2001) and Andresson et al. (2002) show that international strategies are formulated to tap local know-how and resources to increase competitiveness. In more recent work Dunning Moreover, China consistently increased in attractiveness to receive FDI over time, while India's score remained almost constant since 1993 even though this is after India's economic liberalization had begun in earnest.
[ Table 2 here]
Analytical Framework
We use Porter's model, also known as the diamond framework, to explain the differences in the FDI that China has received as compared with India. Porter's model includes four basic interacting elements that a nation can create resulting in advantages that are determinants of a nation's competitive advantage. He argues that each of these four elements individually, and as a whole, lead to a nation's advantage or disadvantage in global markets.
The elements of the diamond are described as follows.
Demand Conditions: Higher demand in local markets leads to national advantage.
Demand may include both the quantity demanded and the sophistication of the consumers in the home market. For example, if the market for a product and its sophistication is largely local, then local firms devote more attention to that product than do foreign firms, leading to competitive advantage when the local firms begin exporting the product. may be motivated to automate or outsource its labor-intensive tasks. Therefore, having a good stock of endowments may be beneficial but is not sufficient to be competitive, just as lack of endowments does not have to be a permanent constraint for any given nation, especially because it creates opportunities for alliances among firms across nations.
3. Firm Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry: Local conditions affect firm strategy. Firm strategy and structure help to determine in which types of industries a nation's firms will prosper. In Porter's model, less competition (low rivalry) makes an industry attractive for entrants or incumbents. However, for an industry and a nation over the long-term, more local rivalry is better since it puts pressure on firms to innovate and improve, making it more likely that they will be able to successfully compete globally.
4. Related and Supporting Industries: Ancillary businesses are needed by firms for parts of the value chain, such as suppliers and distributors who then support local industries.
These include consultancies, contractors, outsourcing firms or any support firms that help in cost effectiveness and innovative inputs and outputs. This effect is strengthened when the suppliers themselves are strong global competitors.
Elements of the Porter's diamond affect one another and depend on each other.
For example, factor conditions will not lead firms to innovate unless there is sufficient rivalry. Increased demand and consumer awareness will lead to increased local firms entering the market, thus increasing rivalry. This increased rivalry should lead to more innovation, which increases the need for support industries to make the value chain stronger thus increasing growth and stimulating more demand.
In addition to the basic diamond, Porter also notes two other variables can play an important role-government and chance. He defines the role of government as that of a catalyst (or impediment) to encourage and support (or suppress) entrepreneurship and policies that help move firms in a nation to higher levels of competitive performance.
Porter emphasized that government should encourage companies to raise their performance, stimulate early demand for advanced products, focus on specialized factor creation, stimulate local rivalry and enforce anti-trust regulations.
Porter also recognized that chance can play a role in invention, entrepreneurship and competitive advantage. He noted that chance events are important since they often create conditions that can shift competition in unexpected ways and alter conditions in the diamond. While chance events can allow shifts in competitive advantage in an industry, a nation's attributes play an important role in how a nation exploits them to its advantage. Porter stated in his 1998a work, "The nation that has the most favorable 'diamond' will be most likely to convert chance events into competitive advantage" (p.
125).
Analysis and Discussion: Explaining the China-India FDI Differential
Using Porter's model of a nation's competitive advantage, we present a comparative analysis of the two countries' determinants in order to identify the differentiators that may explain the large FDI flows to China as compared with India.
Demand conditions
Countries gain a competitive advantage and hence are more attractive when they present an untapped market share for goods and services as well as a growing sophisticated and healthier customer base. India and China are both attractive from this angle with large populations defining potentially underserved markets, with substantial increases in levels of income over time.
China's official population was 981 million in 1980, and India's was 687 million.
In 2008, China still surpassed India at 1.32 billion while India's population was 1.14 billion. India is expected to surpass China in the future since India's growth rate was While China is ahead of India by these measures, both countries have seen impressive growth. In the early 1980s India was ahead, with China surpassing India's GDP per capita in the middle of that decade and sustaining that differential. China's growth spurt was due in part to its ability early on to attract FDI, while India had not yet liberalized its foreign investment regime. In addition, if market size is taken into account as with the figures in table 2, China still received significantly more FDI than India. But the demand factor alone is not very helpful in explaining this differential, as both had very large demand potential.
Factor Conditions:
Much of the classical literature in international development notes that countries with a relatively large pool of transportation and telecom infrastructure, technology and a skilled labor force offer advantages and thus attract FDI.
Infrastructure:
The most common reason cited in the press and manager surveys for China's lead in FDI over India is better infrastructure. In India, infrastructure is seen as an impediment to growth of the manufacturing sector, where gains made through low labor costs are overshadowed by loses due to bottlenecks especially in power supply and transportation (Walker 2006) . Two related points provide perspective in this regard.
First, the differences in infrastructure perceived today did not always exist. In the early 1980s, infrastructure was underdeveloped in both countries, and by some measures was superior in India (Patel and Bhattacharya, 2010, p.53) . Second, from Porter's perspective, infrastructure development is endogenous, meaning that its development will occur to meet the demands for it. An example would be Infosys owners threatening to move their headquarters as a way to lobby the Indian government for a new airport in Bangalore. Huang (2008, p.268) argues that China responded to the needs of foreign investors once firms had been encouraged to invest. This process began in southern China, just north of the border with Hong Kong, in the early 1980s. China began by building infrastructure in special economic zones, partly because the conditions for investment throughout China were very poor.
As a result, China's physical infrastructure has improved significantly and while its electricity supply and communications infrastructure remain weak, its physical infrastructure with roads and railways is substantially better and has grown faster than India's. Since the early 1990s, India's growing economy has witnessed a rise in demand for transport infrastructure and services. Most highways in India are underdeveloped with narrow roads and a majority of India's cities are not well connected nor do they have access to all-weather roads. The dramatic increase in air traffic for both passengers and cargo in recent years has placed a heavy strain on the country's major airports. While India has only recently begun to take steps in this area, China's physical infrastructure has improved significantly due to massive government spending during the last three decades. Tables 3 and 4 [ Tables 3 and 4 here]
Based on data from the World Bank enterprise survey of infrastructure constraints as perceived by firms, both nations have room for improvement especially in comparison to OECD nations and, in most cases, compared to East Asia and Pacific nations as well.
For instance, the time taken to get an electricity connection is about the same in both nations, while firms in India reported a greater loss due to electricity constraints. While a slightly higher percentage of firms in India identify electricity as a major constraint, a higher percentage of Chinese firms report transportation as being the major blockade in doing business (World Bank Enterprise Survey).
Technology:
The Global Information Technology Forum's report (World Economic Forum) compares countries' readiness with regard to technology. This is useful in comparing the two nations in terms of their technology preparedness. The report discusses how countries leverage information communication technology (ICT) for growth and development using the Networked Readiness Index (NRI). Based on a mix of hard data and firm surveys, the NRI is broken down into three components-environment, readiness and usage. In the overall index, India outperformed China from 2002 to 2007, but then China pulled ahead of India in the last two years of reported data (2008-09).
The components of the index indicate that India lags China in infrastructure but that the market environment is better. The political and regulatory environment is also more receptive in India for much of this decade. At the individual and business level, India outranks China, but the Chinese government is more prepared for change than the Indian government, according to these data. In usage of ICT, India lags behind China in all three areas, which includes the individual, business and governmental areas.
Labor Force:
On average China has a larger workforce than India, both in terms of permanent full time employees as well as temporary or seasonal employees (World Bank Enterprise Surveys). This is largely due to the higher participation of women in the workforce in China. However, while in China the percentage of workers who are unskilled is much higher than in India-86 percent compared with 36-in terms of the absolute number of skilled workers, the two countries are on par.
India has a younger workforce compared to China. Over 94.7 percent of the population is less than 65 years old and over 30 percent are under 14. China has about 91 percent of the population under 65 but has only about 18 percent of the population that are younger than 14. However, two factors that work against India is that it has a much lower literacy rate than China (61 percent compared to 91 percent in China) and a smaller urban population (29 percent compared to 43 percent) (World Databank).
While wage comparisons are difficult to make across nations, Ashenfelter and Jurajda (2001) found that basic wage rates for India were lower than in China. Wei's (2005) results suggested that lower labor costs in India explain some of that country's also reportedly added to labor costs since these data were collected.
Overall the comparison of factor conditions is mixed, with China ahead with some and India ahead in others. Both countries have made major progress with infrastructure, but weaknesses remain in both places (Patel and Bhattacharya 2010, Bai and Qian 2010) . India has a younger workforce, but with less literacy overall. Both countries have relatively low wages for both skilled and unskilled labor. As a key differentiator in the flow of FDI, it is difficult to argue that these factor conditions have been the main variable, especially if we consider the flows of FDI since the early 1980s.
3. Firm Strategy, structure and rivalry:
A third part of Porter's diamond emphasizes local conditions that affect firmrelated factors, i.e., how firms are created, organized and managed, and the benefits of rivalry or competition. Ceteris paribus, if a country makes it easier for firms to enter the markets and free competition exists, it attracts FDI. The pattern of rivalry at home also shapes the process of expansion, corporate culture, innovation and growth for firms. In terms of ease of entering the markets or doing business within these nations, China and India appear fairly on par.
While China and India have been liberalizing and attempting to increase competition in their home markets, foreign firms still face serious challenges in entering both of these markets. Table 5 reports key indicators from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. Although there is some variation between China and India in terms of the specific entry constraints reported in these surveys, overall neither country scores well.
While many more firms report having difficulty and needing to pay to obtain licenses and permits in China than India, more firms in India report the need to pay gifts to get basic things accomplished such as obtaining an import license, installing a phone and obtaining access to electric power. Incidence of graft is higher in India, but high in both nations, while firms identifying corruption as a major constraint is about the same in both countries at about one quarter of the firms surveyed.
[ Table 5 here]
Another firm level issue that is influenced by local conditions is the mode of entry 
Related and Supporting Industries:
Porter stated that competitive supplier industries can provide "efficient, early, rapid, and preferential access to inputs," which are basic production needs (1998a) More linkages within an industry attract more FDI, ceteris paribus. With the advent of outsourcing and global production networks, these linkages, both forward and backward, become a critical and essential catalyst for FDI attraction. Porter described these clusters as geographic concentrations of interconnected companies and institutions in a given industry or area (Porter 1998b) . He argued that the enduring competitive advantages in a global economy are often heavily local, arising from concentrations of highly specialized skills, knowledge, institutions and rivals, related businesses and sophisticated customers. In addition to the more traditional small scale rural manufacturing clusters in the clothing sector, India has also developed significant global linkages to software services and auto manufacturing (Gereffi and Guler 2010 , Basant 2008 , Gregory et al. 2009 ).
Despite such achievements, the majority of the Indian clusters share significant constraints such as technological obsolescence, relatively poor product quality, information deficiencies, poor market linkages and inadequate management systems.
They are also focused on the domestic market and poorly linked to global supply and marketing networks. This is a major difference as compared with China, and is essential for understanding the FDI differential. 10 One indicator of the consequence of this difference is that China's share of exports in 2008 that were classified as high-tech was 24 percent as compared with India's 2 percent (World Databank).
The role of government and institutions:
In addition to the core diamond framework, Porter also considers the role of government and institutions, and chance, in understanding the determinants of competitiveness. Porter emphasized the role of government in advancing a nation's agenda in economic development and competitiveness. Government is critical for competitiveness since it sets policy, but other supporting institutions such as the legal system are critical for sustaining competitive advantage for any nation. The private sector is also a crucial actor in improving competitiveness and in influencing economic policy since they are most impacted by the investment environment.
Doing business in either country has its bureaucratic hurdles. The two countries require about the same time and effort to start a business, and they have different and yet equally difficult firm entry constraints (World Bank Enterprise Survey). India has a democratic representative government with stronger legal and financial systems, more political freedom, unrestricted information flow, and a more established private sector.
India was also an original member of the WTO and a member of GATT from the beginning. China has an underdeveloped legal system and joined WTO only in 2001, has less economic freedom, controlled access to information and questionable protection of private property. Yet even with these apparent relative institutional advantages in India, much more FDI has flowed to China.
Policy is the key here. While India's institutions may be stronger, the ambivalence in government policy has affected the environment for FDI in terms of programmatic initiatives adopted to promote or impede business development. For example, India has adopted public-private partnerships in infrastructure development programs, while in China more than 90 percent of the infrastructure development has been through government funding. In India multinationals often build their own campuses with self contained power generation because the public supply is inadequate.
In China, partnering with local government and/or locating in a development zone have been the main routes to access to utilities. In addition, as discussed in Henley (2004) , local governments in China were given incentives to attract FDI while this was not the case in India.
As Meredith (2007) notes, while India is democratic and China is authoritarian, capitalistic India is often anti-business and communist China is usually pro-business.
China's leadership sees economic growth as the key to retaining its hold on power, increasing influence in the world and strengthening the military to cope with threats to national security. In contrast, fifty years of socialist dogma and policies have left India with political and bureaucratic hurdles that constrain rewards for enterprise, initiative and merit on the one hand, and the operation of the price mechanism on the other. Chinese leaders, as part of their longer-term strategic vision, have focused on promoting English language and information technology skills, backed by the necessary telecommunications and power infrastructure, while in India the IT sector's success is largely attributed to its nature and speed that caused it to escape government control and regulation (Thakur 2003; Yardley 2011) . Hence, in China firms must work on developing good government relations while in India it is best to avoid government. Both have their drawbacks.
So far we have explored all but one aspect of Porter's model. While, demand, factor conditions, and firm strategy, structure and rivalry show differences between China and India, these are not significant enough to explain the very large FDI differential. The factors tied to related and supporting industries, and the role of government and institutions, begin to tell the story. China's leaders decided to exploit the global market place for development about a decade earlier than India, and designed policy to explicitly attract and serve foreign firms. Clusters of industries with strong linkages to the global economy were also formed earlier in China, and thus became deeper as a result. We turn now to the additional factor that has not been fully recognized in the literature-'the Chance Factor'-that China was in the 'right place at the right time'.
6. The Chance Factor: timing and location
The last of Porter's factors that gives a nation competitive advantage is not easily quantifiable. Recognizing that not all business success is based on careful planning and brilliant strategies, Porter includes "chance" as a factor that may create competitive advantage for nations. We argue that China's success with FDI as compared to India can be largely attributed to 'chance' being a catalyst; i.e., being located at the right geographic proximity and adopting reforms at a propitious time. East Asian countries were all densely populated with mountainous geography. Land near transportation lines was increasingly expensive. Growing environmental consciousness and consequent government regulation led to further cost increases. And the rise of the value of the yen in the mid-1980s added substantially to Japan's costs. In highly competitive global markets, these rising costs began to hurt the demand for East Asian goods, threatening to undermine continued growth. One response to this competitive challenge was to shift labor intensive, and sometimes polluting, manufacturing operations from these home countries to some place abroad. Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and especially Hong Kong are located on China's doorstep. China began encouraging FDI in the early 1980s, and within a short time period, low-end manufacturing production moved to the special economic zones in southern China. Hong Kong played a pivotal role providing expertise, a legal environment and logistics in those early days when
China was just beginning to develop these aspects of a business environment.
Unlike China in the 1980s, India had no such external impetus to push forward its FDI agenda. India's FDI has not been concentrated from any one nation or region. Some studies have identified overseas Chinese as an important source of FDI into China (Gao, 2003 , Lo & Liu 2009 ) whereas this has been more limited in India (Lall, 2001 ).
11 Saxenian (2002) Consistent with this argument, Wu et al. (2006) argue that China's manufacturing cost advantage over other nations was not merely due to the low cost of labor but more so because of the existence of supply clusters and China's geographic proximity to these global production networks. They argue that if labor costs were the main reason, other nations such as Vietnam and Zimbabwe should have benefited, since they have far lower costs than China. They also point out that most of China's production capacity for export goods is located in the four or five eastern provinces in the coastal regions where wages and cost of living and prices for production are usually the highest in the country. The
Chinese advantage goes beyond labor costs and is specifically reflected in the developed value chain, including sourcing for manufacturing, logistics, warehousing, and storage.
There has been nothing comparable in India until very recently. Over half of the FDI flowing to India is funneled via Mauritius (Wei 2005) , but this is for tax purposes rather than for economic reasons. India began opening to global markets in earnest only in 1991. By then China had a decade of experience with how to best attract FDI with minimal political and economic backlash. This put China in a good position to absorb the rising private capital flows that occurred during the 1990s. With improving production quality and expanding clusters of capabilities with supporting services, China became an agglomeration of low cost manufacturing that then encouraged other firms to follow.
This was an historical moment for equipment manufacturing, especially in telecommunications and information technology, which most likely will not be replicated elsewhere.
China's trading and investment partners provide additional evidence to support the East Asian production networks proposition. China's exports in 1990 were heavily dependent on East Asia, with 61.9 percent being sold there (table 6) [ Table 6 here]
In contrast, in 1990, India was still largely following the bilateral trade process with rudimentary building production networks, if any. As see in Table 6 [ Table 7 here]
Implications
This evidence of trade and FDI lend support for our hypothesis that China had the right combination of economic history and timing that enabled its building of alliances with other nations in the form of production networks. This process began a decade earlier than India positioning China as a better place to receive FDI. China's early entry into East Asian production networks was happenstance due to its geographical location, and while opening to the global economy by establishing special economic zones was a conscious policy, the timing of it was coincidental. 12 Together, the timing and location of building these alliances has been a key factor pushing China ahead of India in terms of FDI.
One view of this result is that while India's lower volume of FDI compared to China may not be worrisome in itself, FDI as a vehicle for technology transfer and a mechanism for accessing global markets provides an advantage in terms of market positioning. FDI helps tie local companies into international production networks that bring together component suppliers, assemblers, supply chain managers and buyers.
Domestic firms can increase their productivity by accessing technology and management practices from foreign partners, which enhances their international competitiveness (Ernest and Kim 2002) . A recent contribution to this line of reasoning is Breznitz and Murphee (2011) who argue that China's process innovation capability is due to just these types of connections to global firms. Following our argument, India would not have the same innovation dynamics, at least in manufacturing.
Another view is that the now more developed India perhaps does not need FDI as a conduit to development as it might have in the past. An empirical study by Kose et al. (2007) suggests that emerging market economies have become less tied to the industrialized economies because they have been decoupling. In recent years India's former self-reliance resulting in a strong domestic sector seems to be paying off and its emphasis on 'homegrown' entrepreneurship is poised to become its key ingredient for economic success. India has managed to spawn a number of reputable companies able to compete internationally with the best of Europe and the United States. Many of these firms are in knowledge-based industries, such as software giants Infosys and Wipro and
Ranbaxy and Dr Reddy's Labs in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors, just to name a few. Further, for the emerging economies, intra-group trade became relatively more important than trade with industrial countries, while the group's economic structures have become increasingly similar. Another recent paper by Kaur (2009) proposes that the statistical patterns of convergence and decoupling may be analogous to the flying geese pattern of shifting comparative advantage, with more advanced economies moving up in sophistication and passing the baton to other emerging economies. She argues that there is a change in the degree of vertical specialization in global production networks, with supply chain management now allowing different production stages to be spread across more locations. India's strength in services has created a competitive advantage in the coordination of these activities across firms and across nations (Ghani, Grover and Kharas 2011) .
Decoupling has also received a lot of attention with respect to China in the wake of the 2008-09 global financial crisis. If China can grow without the U.S., in particular, then China can be instrumental in pulling the U.S., and the global economy, out of recession. Much discussion has focused on the need for China to shift to domestic demand as its engine of growth with less reliance on exports, especially after the decline in demand from the developed economies in the wake of the crisis (e.g., Qi and Prime 2009 ). Official policy in China recognizes this as a goal, and steps have been taken. To date, however, China's exports continue to grow, as does its foreign exchange reserves.
India is much less reliant on the global economy for its growth, and hence has weathered the crisis well.
By the 2000s, the FDI differential between China and India continued but inward investment to India increased quickly (Table 1) . Over the decade India's economy increasingly integrated with the East Asian economies, giving it some of the advantages that China has enjoyed for some time. Infrastructure has improved in India, but more needs to be done. Perhaps now the pressure to invest in infrastructure will be sufficient to ease these constraints. India's higher growth has stimulated rising incomes there with new domestic market opportunities for domestic and foreign firms alike.
As the two nations grow and knowledge transfer diffuses into these economies, one can expect new symbiotic relationships with other nations in the new age of strategic alliances. For example, Japan has begun to view India as a place with substantial investment and manufacturing potential. Due to very limited political and economic history with India, Japan's latest approach to India has so far also been reciprocated and We argue that the differential is largely due to China's fortuitous 'location and timing' that placed China in the center of the building of production networks with East Asian investment beginning in the early 1980s. Alongside, resolute government policy and programmatic initiatives adopted to promote business development in China (as opposed to India) helped strengthen China's competitiveness earlier and more successfully than India. A case in point is the establishment of the special economic zones in southern China in the early 1980s that provided incentives, labor and infrastructure for foreign firms to locate there for low-cost, labor-intensive manufacturing. Simultaneously, East Asian firms were central to the manufacturing supply chain, especially driven by electronic equipment, thus, moving to China was geographically and culturally convenient. This placed China in the center of the East Asian building production network; an opportunity that India missed at the time.
Our analysis covers the key conditions that are typically addressed in the literature, but we are limited by the lack of systematic econometric data that would allow us to measure the relative importance of our variables. In this sense understanding the attractiveness of these two economies to FDI covers many "eclectic" reasons that Dunning described so well. In sum, China and India have developed in very different ways and so a systematic comparison will yield multiple reasons for differences in results. What is clear is that China has attracted and utilized much more FDI than India, and it seems unlikely that India will catch up in this respect, at least for some time to come. At this point we cannot say which path will be the most successful over the longrun. 
